





































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 






HARBOR BREEZE CORPORATION, 
et al., 
 




SPORTFISHING, INC., et al., 
 




























ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 
MOTION FOR ORDER FOR 
DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS 
[Dkt. 276], GRANTING IN PART 
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
[Dkt. 277], AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES [Dkt. 278] 
 )  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Plaintiffs Harbor Breeze Corporation and L.A. Waterfront Cruises, LLC brought 
this false advertising lawsuit against Defendants Newport Landing Sportfishing, Inc., 
Daveys Locker Sportfishing, Inc., Ocean Explorer, Inc., and Freelance Sportfishing, Inc.  































(Dkt. 1.)  The case proceeded to trial before a jury in June 2019.  After five days of trial, 
the jury returned a verdict finding Defendants had engaged in false advertising in 
violation of the Lanham Act.   (Dkt. 271.)  The jury, however, awarded Plaintiffs $0 in 
actual damages and $0 in disgorgement of profits.  (Id.) 
 
Before the Court are three post-trial motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ motion for an order 
disgorging Defendants’ profits, (Dkt. 276), (2) Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent 
injunction, (Dkt. 277), and (3) Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, (Dkt. 278).  For the 
following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions for disgorgement of profits and for attorneys’ fees 
are DENIED.  Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction is GRANTED IN PART. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
 This whale of a tale concerns the marketing to customers in the multimillion-dollar 
whale watching industry of the Los Angeles and Orange County metropolitan area.  
Plaintiffs and Defendants are competitors in this industry.  Both offer whale watching 
cruises for locals and tourists off the California coast.  Plaintiffs operate in Long Beach 
and San Pedro in Los Angeles County, and Defendants operate in Newport Beach in 
Orange County. 
 
 At issue in this case is how Defendants advertised their whale watching cruises to 
customers.  In September 2017, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court, asserting 
claims for (1) false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), 
(2) violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., and (3) 
violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq.  This case 
proceeded to trial before a jury in June 2019. 
 































 At trial, Plaintiffs focused on two aspects of Defendants’ advertising.  First, 
Plaintiffs contended that Defendants engaged in false advertising with respect to their 
location.  For instance, if a consumer searched on the internet for “Long Beach whale 
watching,” the consumer would be directed to a page on Defendants’ website, which 
made repeated use of the phrase “Long Beach residents and visitors,” suggesting that 
Defendants’ cruises depart from Long Beach, not Newport Beach.  (See Dkt. 292 [Day 1 
Vol. III Transcript] at 74:14–75:8.)  Second, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants engaged 
in false advertising with respect to their pricing.  Defendants advertised, for example, a 
“$10 whale watching special.”  (Id. at 75:19–76:5.)  A consumer, however, could never 
get on Defendants’ whale watching cruise for only ten dollars.  In addition to that $10 
price, Defendants also charged a $2.50 fuel surcharge and a 2% wharfage fee.  (See id. at 
76:6–77:22.)  There was also evidence that calling these extra charges a “fuel surcharge” 
or “wharfage fee” was misleading because these fees were a way to get extra revenue, not 
tied to actual expenses, and Defendants did not disclose these fees until late in the 
process.  (See Dkt. 294 [Day 3 Vol. I Transcript] at 123:6–128:4.) 
 
 After five days of trial, the jury reached a verdict.  The jury found that Plaintiffs 
had proven all elements necessary to find that the Defendants had engaged in false 
advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.  (Dkt. 271.)  On the question of damages, 
however, the jury awarded $0 for Plaintiffs’ actual damages and $0 for Defendants’ 







































III.  DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS 
 
 Plaintiffs ask this Court to grant equitable relief in the form of disgorgement of 
profits.  (Dkt. 276.)  The Lanham Act provides that a plaintiff may recover the 
defendant’s profits if the plaintiff prevails on a claim for false advertising.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(a).  A claim for disgorgement of profits is an equitable remedy.  Fifty-Six Hope 
Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).  In the Ninth 
Circuit, to recover a defendant’s profits, the plaintiff must prove that the false advertising 
was willful.  See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 439 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (interpreting the Lanham Act’s remedies provision to require willfulness to 
recover disgorgement of profits for trademark infringement).  Willfulness “carries a 
connotation of deliberate intent to deceive” and “require[s] a connection between a 
defendant’s awareness of its competitors and its actions at those competitors’ expense.”  
Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 892 F.2d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1990)), 
abrogated on other grounds by SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., Ltd., 839 
F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 
 While disgorgement of profits is an equitable remedy, the parties and the Court 
submitted this question to the jury.  The Court instructed the jury that if Plaintiffs proved 
they had been injured as a result of the false advertising, Plaintiffs may recover “[a]ny 
profits earned by the [D]efendants that are attributable to the [D]efendants’ false 
advertising, if the [P]laintiffs prove that the [D]efendants’ false advertising was willful.”  
(Dkt. 259 [Jury Instructions] No. 17.)  The Court further instructed the jury that “[t]he 
[D]efendants’ false advertising is willful if the [D]efendants knew their advertising was 
false or misleading, or they acted with reckless disregard for, or willful blindness to, the 
false or misleading nature of their advertising.”  (Id. No. 20.)  Based on these 
instructions, the jury determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to $0 for disgorgement of 































Defendants’ profits.  Plaintiffs now ask the Court to disregard the jury’s verdict and 
award them Defendants’ profits. 
 
 Neither party addresses what standard the Court should apply.  Generally, where a 
court tries legal and equitable issues together in the same proceeding, legal issues are to 
be determined first, and the findings of the jury are binding on the court, as the trier of 
equitable claims.  See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Cont’l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 986 n.7 (9th 
Cir. 1976), aff’d, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  Here, Plaintiffs chose to submit the question of 
disgorgement of profits to the jury.  Consequently, the Court must give full effect to that 
verdict.  See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that 
although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) allows a court to submit equitable issues 
to an advisory jury, the court must give “full effect” to a jury verdict if the court did not 
specify it was an advisory jury prior to trial).1  Where a jury has decided an issue, a court 
can set aside that verdict and grant judgment as matter of law only if “a reasonable jury 
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the [prevailing] party.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)–(b).  And where substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, a 
court may grant a new trial if “the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.”  
Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 
2001) (quoting United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 
 The Court finds no reason to set aside the jury’s verdict.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ 
assertion, the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence.  First, a jury could 
reasonably find that Defendants’ false advertising was not willful.  Pam Watts, one of the 
individual owners of Defendants, testified that Defendants had made changes to their 
                                                          
1 The Court and the parties had agreed to consult an advisory jury, pursuant to Rule 39(c), for findings 
related to Defendants’ unclean hands equitable defense.  (See also Dkt. 271 [Verdict Form] [asking the 
jury whether Plaintiffs had also engaged in false advertising in Questions 7, 8, and 9].)  Neither the 
Court nor the parties discussed submitting the issue of disgorgement of profits to the jury on an advisory 
basis. 































websites and advertisements following state court litigation in 2012 over false advertising 
and afterwards, Defendants thought they were in compliance.  (Dkt. 294 [Day 3 Vol. I 
Transcript] at 20:3–22.)  One of those changes was to add language on every page that 
Defendants’ boats departed from “beautiful Newport Beach.”  (See Dkt. 293 [Day 2 Vol. 
I Transcript] at 10:16–25.)  Second, a jury could reasonably find that Defendants’ profits 
were not attributable to false advertising.  See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. 
S. S. Kresge, 316 U.S. 203, 206 (1942) (holding that a plaintiff is not entitled to profits 
not attributable to the defendant’s unlawful conduct under the Lanham Act).  There was 
evidence that, even including the extra fees, Defendants offered cheaper whale watching 
cruises than Plaintiffs.  (See Dkt. 293 [Day 2 Vol. I Transcript] at 116:6–117:12, 123:9–
13.)  The jury reasonably could have concluded that Defendants’ profits were attributable 
to its competitive price, not any false advertising they had done.  Consumers might care 
more about getting a good deal than where the cruise departs or whether a few dollars get 
added to the ticket cost. 
 
 Nor is the jury’s verdict against the clear weight of the evidence.  If the Court were 
to take its own view of the evidence, it would reach the same result.  With respect to 
Defendants’ advertising on location, the evidence at trial showed that Defendants 
intended to optimize their search engine results, not confuse consumers.  There was also 
no evidence that Defendants intended to mislead consumers with respect to their ticket 
prices––even if it was, in fact, misleading––since Defendants ultimately disclosed all fees 
prior to purchase.  Because Plaintiffs have failed to prove that Defendants’ false 





































IV.  PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
 
 Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from engaging in 
further false advertising.  “In most cases, after a full trial finding false advertising, a final 
injunction is appropriate.”  McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:37 
(5th ed. 2019).  Similarly, with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims under the Uniform 
Competition Law, an injunction is the primary form of available relief.  See Clayworth v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 790 (2010).  To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must satisfy 
a four-factor test, demonstrating “(1) that it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.”  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
391 (2006).  The Court concludes that all four factors weigh in favor of an injunction. 
 
 First, Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable injury.  The jury found that one or more 
of Defendants’ statements at issue caused or was likely to cause damage to Plaintiffs.  
(Dkt. 271 [Verdict Form].)  Nilda Langston, Harbor Breeze Corporation’s vice president 
of operations, testified that Plaintiffs regularly receive calls from customers who are 
confused by Defendants’ advertising and who believe that Plaintiffs offer Defendants’ 
$16 whale watching special.  (Dkt. 293 [Day 2 Vol. I Transcript] at 111:12–114:1, 116:6–
117:12.)  Langston also testified that a customer once attempted to board Plaintiffs’ 
whale watching cruise with a Groupon voucher from Defendants.  (Id. at 117:13–118:12.)  
When the customer became upset, Langston ultimately let him take Plaintiffs’ cruise for 
free.  (Id. at 118:13–18.)  Other employees similarly testified about confused and angry 































customers.  (See id. at 141:6–145:8.)  There was also evidence that this consumer 
confusion has harmed Plaintiffs’ business reputation and damaged their goodwill.2 
 
 Second, legal remedies are inadequate.  Here, Plaintiffs have established harm to 
their business reputation and goodwill.  This kind of harm is difficult to quantify.  See 
Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949–50 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[A]n award 
of damages would be inadequate, simply because the harm caused to [the plaintiff’s] 
reputation, goodwill, and brand is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.”), aff’d, 658 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance, 
944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]ntangible injuries, such as damage to . . . goodwill, 
qualify as irreparable harm.”).  Indeed, the jury was unable to find a reasonable basis to 
quantify Plaintiffs’ damage and awarded no monetary relief. 
 
 Third, the balance of hardships favors an injunction.  In determining whether 
injunctive relief is appropriate, “courts must balance the competing claims of injury and 
must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested 
relief.”  Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2009).  Here, 
the jury found that Defendants have engaged in false advertising.  An injunction in favor 
of Plaintiffs would serve the narrow purpose of preventing such false advertising in the 
future.  It would not be a hardship for Defendants to refrain from making false or 
misleading statements.  In the absence of relief, Plaintiffs will continue to suffer harm to 
their reputation and goodwill. 
 
                                                          
2 Plaintiffs also submit declarations from other whale watching operators in Southern California to 
support the assertion that Defendants’ acts irreparably harm other whale watching providers.  (See Dkts. 
282–85.)  Defendants object to the admissibility of these declarations.  (See Dkts. 304–07.)  As the 
Court does not consider these declarations, it does not need to address Defendants’ evidentiary 
objections. 































 Lastly, the public interest favors an injunction.  There is a public interest in 
ensuring honest advertising.  See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 27:36 (5th ed. 2019) (“An injunction can vindicate the public interest in truthful 
advertising.”).  There is also a public interest in favor of full and honest competition. 
 
 Defendants argue the injunction would be moot because they have already changed 
their advertising.  But this provides no guarantee that they will keep those changes in 
place.  Since Defendants could immediately return to their prior ways, a permanent 
injunction is necessary to ensure that Defendants do not repeat their false advertising as 
soon as this case ends.  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. 
Supp. 2d 1197, 1121–22 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“A private party’s discontinuation of unlawful 
conduct does not make the dispute moot, however.  An injunction remains appropriate to 
ensure that the misconduct does not recur as soon as the case ends.” (quoting BMG Music 
v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2005))).  As all four factors weigh in Plaintiff’s 
favor, the Court will exercise its discretion to issue an injunction. 
 
 The Court must now consider the terms and scope of a permanent injunction.  The 
scope of an injunction is within the broad discretion of the district court.  
TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011).  An overly 
broad injunction, however, risks burdening truthful commercial speech, which is 
protected under First Amendment.  The First Amendment thus requires that an injunction 
against false advertising be “narrowly drawn.”  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980); TrafficSchool.com, 653 F.3d at 
830 (“The district court [is] required to tailor the injunction so as to burden no more 
protected speech than necessary.”). 
 
 In crafting the injunction, the Court must fulfill its obligation to prevent 
Defendants from misleading the public with false advertising while protecting 































Defendants’ First Amendment rights.  See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 
1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 1986).  The Ninth Circuit achieved this goal in U-Haul by 
modifying an injunction to prohibit only false or deceptive advertising, where the 
injunction otherwise seemed to prohibit future comparative advertising even if it was 
truthful.  See id. at 1042–43.  And the injunction in TrafficSchool.com failed to meet this 
balance when it required the defendant to display a “splash screen” to all visitors to a 
website and visitors had to click though the splash screen to access the site.  653 F.3d at 
820.  This injunction burdened more protected speech than necessary because it applied 
to all content on the website, not just deceptive speech.  Id. 
 
 With these principles in mind, the Court will make several changes to Plaintiffs’ 
proposed permanent injunction.  First, the Court declines to require Defendants to place a 
statement of their location on all advertisements or all of Defendants’ webpages.  In this 
regard, Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction is overbroad.  The Court will instead tailor the 
injunction to require the disclosure of Defendants’ location of departure for the 
advertising at issue—namely, webpages and advertisements that repeatedly use the name 
of another city, making it seem as if Defendants’ whale watching cruises depart from a 
city other than Newport Beach.  It is not misleading, for example, for Defendants to state 
on their website that they are about twenty miles away from Long Beach.  But a repeated 
reference to Long Beach, without a clear disclosure regarding Defendants’ location of 
departure, may mislead or confuse consumers. 
 
 Second, the Court will not require Defendants to edit their webpages’ source code 
to include the text “Newport Beach Cruise Operator” in the title tag or the phrase “All 
Cruises Depart from Newport Beach” in the description tag.  Text that appears in title 
tags or description tags affects how the webpage appears in search engine results.  By 
requiring Defendants to use certain phrases on all webpages, the proposed injunction 
would significantly burden protected speech, similar to the splash screen the Ninth 
































Circuit found problematic in Trafficschool.com.  The proposed injunction would also 
unfairly impair Defendants’ ability to optimize their search engine results. 
 
 Third, the Court will not order Defendants to relinquish all domain names with 
other city names.  At trial, Plaintiffs did not focus on domain names as a means of false 
advertising.  There are also entirely lawful reasons for Defendants to own domain names 
with other city names.  Defendants may want to reserve a particular domain name, for 
instance, in the event Defendants decide to expand their operations to other cities.  This 
requested relief is overbroad and goes beyond the scope of the false advertising at issue 
in the trial. 
 
 Fourth, the Court will not restrict Defendants’ ability to purchase certain types of 
advertising.  Plaintiffs seek to bar Defendants from purchasing the names of geographic 
locations other than Newport Beach on pay-per-click advertising systems like Google 
AdWords.  Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ “aggressive purchase of geographical 
terms as AdWords” has “block[ed] out other operators.”  (Dkt. 310 [Pls.’ Reply] at 21.)  
But there is nothing wrong with Defendants seeking to advertise their whale watching 
cruises in other cities in Southern California, so long as consumers understand the cruises 
depart from Newport Beach.  There is also nothing wrong with the fact that Defendants 
invest heavily in pay-per-click advertising systems and outbid other operators for 
advertising space.  Plaintiffs admit, in fact, that the purchase of AdWords of any sort is 
ordinarily lawful.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction is overbroad because it seeks to 
bar Defendants’ from any use of other geographic terms, rather than the misleading use 
of geographic terms. 
 
 Fifth, the Court is concerned about the administrability and feasibility of an 
injunction that attempts to enjoin what appears in organic Google search results or third-
party websites like Groupon.  Plaintiffs offer no evidence as to how much control 
































Defendants have over these sites, and the Court does not wish to harpoon Defendants 
over content they cannot control.  Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt the language 
of Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction to the extent it holds Defendants responsible for content 
created by third parties. 
 
 In sum, Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction is GRANTED IN PART. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction.  The injunction proposed by Plaintiffs, however, is 
overbroad.  The Court will instead issue an injunction that focuses on the kind of 
advertising that was at issue at trial.  If Defendants repeat the name of a city other than 
Newport Beach in an advertisement or on a webpage, they will be required to clearly 
disclose that their cruises depart from Newport Beach on that advertisement or webpage.  
In addition, Defendants must advertise a price for a ticket that is the entire final cost of 
the ticket, excluding any legally collected sales tax or any optional, add-on services or 
goods. 
 
V.  ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
 
 Plaintiffs seek $1,515,679 in attorneys’ fees.  (Dkt. 278.)  Under the Lanham Act, a 
court “in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”3 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  According to the Supreme Court, an “exceptional” case “is simply 
one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s 
litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014).  “District courts may determine 
                                                          
3  Defendants argue Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party because the jury failed to award them any 
damages.  In order to be a prevailing party, the party must have “achieved a material alteration in the 
legal relationship of the parties that is judicially sanctioned.”  Fifty-Six Hope Rd., 778 F.3d at 1078 
(quoting Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2009)).  As discussed above, Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief, so Plaintiffs are the prevailing 
party. 
































whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, 
considering the totality of the circumstances.”  Id.  A “nonexclusive” list of factors to 
consider in making this determination includes “frivolousness, motivation, objective 
unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in 
particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”  
SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6). 
 
 This is not an exceptional case.  Plaintiffs’ case does not stand out from others with 
respect to its substantive strength.  As discussed above, Plaintiffs failed to prove that 
Defendants’ false advertising was willful.  Plaintiffs’ lack of proof of damages also 
proved to be a fundamental problem.  In the end, Plaintiffs’ attorneys expended over 
3,300 hours on this case without recovering any damages for their client.  Although the 
injunction confers some public benefit, stopping misleading advertising about whale 
watching does not ameliorate a serious public harm.  Cf. TrafficSchool.com, 653 F.3d at 
832 (remanding for district court to consider, in determining attorneys’ fees, the 
substantial benefits gained through an injunction where plaintiffs stopped consumers 
from mistakenly transferring sensitive personal information to a commercial website 
called DMV.org).  The fact that Plaintiffs have spent eight years litigating related issues, 
both in state and federal court, does not make this an exceptional case.  If anything, it 
undermines Plaintiffs’ claim of exceptionality, as the litigation has achieved mixed 
results.  Nor did Defendants unreasonably litigate his case.  A vigorous defense is not 
unreasonable.  Defendants likely had a good faith belief that Plaintiffs could not prove 
they suffered damages, a belief ultimately substantiated by the jury’s verdict.  Plaintiffs’ 




































VI.  CONCLUSION   
 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions for disgorgement of profits and for 
attorneys’ fees are DENIED.  Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction is 
GRANTED IN PART.  Pursuant to this order, the Court will issue a judgment and 
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